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Introduction
Regulatory agencies and employers use a variety of
statistics to monitor or describe the health and safety of
workers.Legislators and other decision makers utilize the
samesetofmeasuresindevelopingpublicpolicy,
promulgating or revising statutes and allocating resources.
Employers can incur significant costsin retrofitting,
training, inspecting, and other activities associated with
regulatory mandates.Likewise, governments must allocate
scarce resources to the occupational health and safety
effort at the expense of other programs.Due to the
potential impact of decisions based on occupational health
and safety statistics, it is important that the validity of
these measures be explored.
Threemeasurescommonlyusedtoassessoverall
effectiveness of the health and safety effort at both the
micro (organizational) and macro (state or federal) levels
aretheincidence ratefor occupationalinjuriesand
illnesses, the lost workday case incidence rate and the lost
workdayrate. The occupationalinjuryandillnesses
incidence rate, defined as the number of cases of an injury
or illness per 100 full-time employees for a given year,
measures the frequency of occurrence of recordable accidents2
or exposures resulting in injury or illness.The lost
workday case incidence rate, expressed as the number of
injuries or illnesses resulting in off-work and restricted
work days per 100 full-time employees for a given year, is
an indicator of the relative severity of injuries and
illnesses.The lost workday rate, also a severity measure,
is the number of actual number of days missed from work per
100 full-time workers each year due to occupational injuries
or illnesses.
The underlying assumption in evaluating changes in any
of the rates is that the observed changes are the result of
actions taken or not taken by the employer or the regulatory
agency. The objective of this study is to delineate
external factors (those factors outside the control of the
employer or regulatory agency) affecting the injury/illness
incidence, lost workday case incidence, and lost workday
rates.Factors to be studied include size of the firm
(numberofemployees);OccupationalSafetyand Health
Administration (OSHA) expenditures; performance measures for
OSHA, including number of inspections, number of citations,
and penalties; statewide economic indicators, including the
unemployment rate and adjusted gross state product; and
workers'compensationclaimacceptancerate. The
association between the selected factors and the incidence
rateswillbeevaluatedbyreviewingthepublished
literature for each factor and by performing an analysis of
covariance for factors for which there is available data for3
the State of Oregon from 1978 to 1987.For the factors that
show a significant relationship with the incidence rates,
possible mechanisms for the association will be discussed.
The results of this study will be useful in evaluating
changes in incidence rates for a specific organization or
for the State of Oregon as a whole.An injury/illness
incidence, lost workday case incidence, or lost workday rate
could conceivably be adjusted for any one or a combination
of the significant external factors, providing for more
meaningful assessment of efforts put forth by employers or
regulatory agencies.Literature Review
OSHA
4
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 mandated
that a national system of safety standards be created and
enforced. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA), within in the Department of Labor, is responsible
for promulgating the standards.The standards are enforced
via inspections performed by OSHA; violations are cited and,
for certain categories of violations, penalties assessed.
Violations are designated, in increasing order of severity,
asbeing de minimis,nonserious,serious,repeat,or
willful.1Individual states are allowed to develop plans
foradministeringoccupationalsafetyandhealth
surveillanceaslongastheplansare"atleastas
effective" as OSHA.2The rationale behind the creation of
OSHA was that adherence to the standards would create safer
workplaces and thereby lower injury and illness rates.
To assess the actual impact of the occupational safety
and health regulatory effort on injury/illness incidence and
lost workday rates, it is necessary to identify the fraction
of occupational injuries and illnesses that result from
conditions which regulators are capable of monitoring.To
be "OSHA-preventable," an injury or exposure resulting in an
illness must be the result of the violation of a standard.
Estimatesoftheproportionofoccupationalinjuries
traceable to violation of one or more standards range from5
10 to 26%.34If the percentage is further restricted to
thoseinjuriesforwhichadetectableviolationwas
implicated, the upper limit drops to 18%.5Even these
estimates may be high, since the criteria for designating an
injury as being the result of a violation is that the
violation was a factor in the accident, and not necessarily
the sole cause.6Thus, the maximum expected reduction in
injury incidence rates under optimum enforcement is less
than 30%.These estimates ignore the possible "ripple"
effects which may be realized from safety efforts in non-
compliance areas which would not have existed except for the
need to comply with the OSHA standards.
Due to the time lag between exposure to a harmful agent
andthemanifestationofarecognizableoccupational
disease, it is difficult to determine the percentage of
occupational illnesses that are caused by a violation of an
OSHA standard.Accordingly, there are no available studies
toquantifythefractionofoccupationalillnesses
attributable to a violation of one or more OSHA standards.
ThecomplexnatureoftheoverallOSHAeffort,
including standard development and promulgation, enforcement
activities, consultation, and indirect effects makes it
difficult to derive a single statistic to measure the effect
of OSHA activities on injury and illness rates.Several
bookshavebeenpublishedwhichcombinestatistical
evaluation and qualitative analysisinanattemptto
determine the impact of OSHA on occupational injuries and6
illnesses .7,8,9
In a study which received attention in the lay media,
Seligman correlated budget expenditures for OSHA and lost
workdayratesfortheU.S.andfoundacorrelation
coefficient of +0.9 for the period 1972 through 1982,
suggesting that increased spending on OSHA resulted in an
increase in the number of lost workdays per 100 workers for
a given year.°The analysis did not control for any
confounding variables, such as increased reporting, changes
in the workers'compensation system,or the effect of
economic trends during the study period.
A comparison of safety enforcement expenditures per
worker and corresponding accident frequency rates between
Ohio and Michigan for the period 1960 through 1963 (pre-
OSHA) revealed no significant differences between the two
statesinaccidentfrequency rates,even though Ohio
expenditures were triple those of Michigan ($0.63 versus
$0.20 per worker per year).n A composite index, comprised
of the safety budget and number of inspectors per worker,
and indices of the extensiveness and strictness of standards
for occupational safety in each of the states for the year
1967, was not related to injury frequency rates.12
StudiesoftheeffectofOSHAinspectionson
injury/illness incidence rates have produced conflicting
conclusions.Most analyses of aggregate data have found
either no significant relationship between the number of
inspections performed and the injury/illness incidence rate7
for a given period" or mixed results, with significant
reductions for one year (1973) but not for the following
year (1974)."Mendeloff's study focusing on inspection
effects for specific types of injury found significant
reductionsininjuryratesasaresultofOSHA
inspections." The specific injury classes studied included
classes most likely to be associated with a violation of a
standard, i.e. caught in or between, slips and falls, eye
injury, etc.17
Several factors may confound the relationship between
the number of inspections and injury/illness incidence, lost
workday case incidence or lost workday rates.One such
factor is record keeping.One of the objectives of OSHA is
to improve accident record keeping and reporting.Thus, a
consequence of improved OSHA surveillance is an apparent
rise in the reported injury/illness rate, even if the true
rate remains constant or decreases.Although there is
general agreement that this phenomena is taking place, no
research has been published that quantifies the effect.
The skill of the inspectors in recognizing hazards or
violations could have an impact on the quality of the
inspections.Less experienced inspectors could be expected
to miss subtle hazards that a more experienced inspector
could identify.The recognition and correction of a higher
proportion of the hazards present prior to the hazards
causing an injury or illness should lower occupational
injury/illness rates.The formative years of OSHA and8
periods of rapid expansion are associated with a higher
percentage oflessskilled inspectors. There are no
published studies that examine the experience level of OSHA
inspectors and the quality or quantity of inspections.
The breadth and depth of inspections prescribed by
OSHA's upper management conceivably could alter the effect
of inspections on injury and illness rates.More thorough
inspectionscouldlowertheratesviathemechanism
identified above, i.e. by finding a greater proportion of
the hazards that exist at a given site.In 1975, OSHA
changed the emphasis of the inspection program by reducing
the number of inspections in favor of performing more in-
depth inspections.18The implementation of the Target
Industry Program (TIP) in 1973 was an attempt to concentrate
on industries with high accident incidence rates, under the
assumption that focusing on these high-risk industries would
yield the greatest reduction in occupational injuries given
the limited enforcement resources.Mendeloff challenged
this assumption by stating that high-risk industries in
general are characterized by a lower percentage of injuries
caused by a detectable violation of a standard than for
industry as a whole.°
A criticism of studies that conclude OSHA inspections
have an insignificant effect based on examination of pre-
and post-inspection injury/illness ratesis that these
studies do not account for the deterrence effect.The
anticipation of being inspected might tend to lower the9
baseline injury rate in industry.
The relative intensity of OSHA inspections can be
measured using both the number and severity of violations
cited and the penalties associated with the more serious
violations.It should be noted that the shift in inspection
emphasis that occurred in 1975 (cited above) was accompanied
by a corresponding shift away from citing de minimis and
nonserious violations towards greater emphasis on serious
violations." There have been no studies published relating
the number or severity levelof violations cited and
occupational injury/illness incidence,lost workday case
incidence, or lost workday rates.
The impact of OSHA penalties on injury/illness rates
has been evaluated primarily by using econometric models to
determine the potential financial impact of the penalties on
a firm.The aim of these studies was to determine whether
the expected penalties provided sufficient incentive for the
affected firms to comply with OSHA regulations. For 1977,
the expected cost of non-compliance was calculated to be
$3.90 before an initial inspection and $20.06 after the
initial inspection; the higher post-inspection value is due
tothesignificantlyhigherpenaltiesforrepeat
violations.n The average penalty per violation in 1974 was
reported to be $24,22 although the trend since 1975 has been
to increase in the average fine per violation.23 All of the
studies which have examined OSHA penalties conclude that the
expected cost of non-compliance does not provide adequate10
incentive to comply with OSHA standards given the costs (not
cited)of back-fitting and other activities required to
conform to OSHA regulations. These conclusions are based on
average values; the possibility of large fines for any given
firm probably elicits a greater level of compliance than
would be represented by the average values. The conclusions
also ignore the substantial increase in penalties associated
with repeat,willful,andfailure-to-abate($1000/day)
penalties,aswellasthepossibilityofcriminal
prosecution for management personnel in the event of a death
resulting from a willful violation, falsifying records,
etc.m The effect of failure-to-abate penalties is weakened
by the ability of the firm to suspend the penalty pending
appeal of the violation25 and the fact that the failure-to-
abate penalty is only applied for a maximum of ten days.26
Other non-monetary "penalties", notably public and worker
relations, also provide an incentive for firms to comply
with OSHA regulations.
Thereareno published studiesthatexplore the
relationship between magnitude or frequency of penalties and
injury/illness incidence, lost workday case incidence, or
lost workday rates.
Size of Firm
Although the size of a firm is not an external factor
(to the firm) in the strict sense, it is a parameter over
which neither the safety manager nor regulatory personnel
have any control.Thus, the effect that firm size has on11
injury/illness rates is of interest in interpreting these
rates for a given firm relative to other firms in the same
industry classification.
There is only one published study that addresses the
relationship between firm size and injury/illness rates
specifically.flLeigh used Bureau of Labor Statistics
occupational injury and illness incidence rate data for 28
manufacturing industry classifications for 1982.The 28
industryclassificationswerechosenbasedonthe
availabilityofdataforalleightsizecategories.
Analysis of the data revealed a non-normal distribution,
with low values of injury/illness incidence rates for the
smallest(1-19 employees) and largest(>2500 employees)
firms, with a peak at the 50-99 size category and a long
tail to the right. The reported differences between
injury/illnessratesforthesizecategorieswere
significant at the p(z)=.05 level, and were controlled for
percent production workers, percent women, weekly hours, and
weekly earnings.
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Mechanisms suggested for the lower rates in larger
firmsincludebetterinterviewingandscreeningof
candidates for employment and increased spending on safety
and health relative to medium size firms.The former
explanation would be valid for employers utilizing back
screening programs given the high representation of back
injuries in the overall injury rate; prospective employees
with a history of back problems would be screened out by12
such programsprior toemployment. Thelowerrates
documented for small firms may be due to under-reporting,
since smaller firms receive less scrutiny from OSHA; due to
enhanced selection of workers, since in very small firms the
owner can "hand-pick" from friends and relatives; or due to
an owner-operator maintaining a safe workplace since any
hazards may place the owner in danger.29Of the possible
explanations cited only the hypothesis of better screening
and interviewing in larger firms has been empirically tested
and verified.30
Although the study cited above is the only published
study examining the effect of firm size directly, several
studies have used firm size as a variable in multiple linear
regression models of injury/illness incidence rates."2,33
The reported regression coefficients are small negative
values, suggesting a slight reduction in injury/illness
incidence rates as firm size increases.It should be noted
that the assumed linear relationship is only valid when firm
size is greater than 50 employees based on Leigh's findings.
Economic Indicators
The degree to which changes in economic factors affect
occupational health and safety rates has been studied at
both the macro and micro levels.In general, the studies
focus on the effect of the business cycle in general or
specifically on changes in employment level.Parameters
correlated with indices of occupational health and safety
include unemployment rate, accession rate (number of new13
hires per unit time), growth rate, and output per employee.
The impact of changes in the employment level are based
on the premise that recently hired employees are more likely
tobeinjuredthantheirexperiencedco-workers.
Conversely, during downturns in the economic cycle, less
experienced workers are the first to be laid off, leaving a
higher overall experience level in the workforce.This
phenomena has been verified empirically."'m
Directmeasuresoftherelationshipbetweenthe
accession rate and injury/illness rates reveal a significant
positive relationship.37 The association between changes in
the employment level and injury rates is less pronounced,
although still positive, possibly due to the recall of
experienced workers as opposed to new hires during periods
of labor force expansion38 or to the reluctance of labor to
pursue improvements in safety during contraction, as will be
discussed in the next paragraph.
When the examination of the effect of economic changes
is expanded to include the business cycle as a whole,
competing factors have been identified which exert opposing
forces on injury/illness rates at the same point in the
cycle.The impact of the overall experience level as a
function of changes in employment was explored above.The
intensity of work is increased during economic upswings,
manifestedinfaster production rates,more overtime,
crowded and congested work facilities, and utilization of
older, possibly less safe, equipment; these measures of14
intensityhavebeenimplicated inincreases in
injury/illness rates.39,40,41,42 The effectsofproduction
rates and overtime hours on injury rates have been tested
and verified.°The only counter-cyclical influence on
injury/illness rates is the degree to which labor exerts
pressuretoimprovesafety withinanorganization."
Workers, whether unionized or not, are less likely to seek
improvementsinsafetyduringperiodsofeconomic
contraction,due to a real or perceived threat to job
security in pursuing such improvements."The study by
Robinson (1978) is the only research which has separated out
the effect of labor power by controlling for the number of
new hires and output per employee in examining unemployment
rates, and has reported a negative relationship for this
correlate
Overall,the pro-cyclicalforces haveastronger
influence than the counter-cyclical labor power factor when
examining the relationship between the business cycle and
indicators of occupational health and safety.Studies of
both injuries and fatalities(which are less prone to
reportingdifferencesthaninjuries)haverevealeda
positive correlation between business cycle measures and
injury and fatality rates.
48,49,50
Workers' Compensation
Recently, there has been considerable attention given
in both the lay media and in scientific journals to the
impactthatworkers'compensationsystemsandtheir15
components have on injury/illness incidence, lost workday
case incidence, and lost workday rates.A comprehensive
exploration of the different workers' compensation systems
and their components is beyond the scope of this study.
This section will discuss the basic concepts relevant to
understanding the relationship between workers' compensation
and its impact on occupational injury/illness rates, and the
empirical findings concerning these topics.
Workers'compensationsystemsweredevelopedin
response to the increase in occupational injuries brought
about by the industrial revolution and the inability of the
tort system to deal efficiently with the increased number of
claims.The model used in the United States is one of no-
fault insurance, whereby an employee injured on the job is
compensated for time lost at work via payment of a fixed
percentage of the worker's salary during convalescence and
reimbursement for all medical costs associated with the
occupational injury or illness.The insurance system was
developed to provide speedy and equitable compensation to
injured workers as opposed to the inconsistent awards and
prolonged process characterized by the tort system.Under
the no-fault model, there is no need to determine liability
for either the worker or the employer.
The insurer may be a private entity,a government
agency, or a quasi-government agency.A worker suffering
from an occupational injury or illness submits a claim to
the insurer describing the nature of the injury and the16
circumstancesleading to the injury orillness. The
validity of a claim is based on a determination that the
worker was injured or ill and that the worker's employment
contributedtotheinjuryorillness. Theinsurer
determines the validity of the claim and compensates the
employee in accordance with the standards developed by each
state. Claims are categorized by outcome as being a
fatality,permanenttotaldisability(PTD),permanent
partial disability (PPD), temporary total disability (TTD),
temporarypartialdisability(TPD),ormedicalonly.
Injuries which require only first aid treatment are not
reported or compensated under workers' compensation.
The four basic goals of workers' compensation systems
are as follows:
1) Broad coverage of employees and work related
injuries and diseases;
2)To pay for medical and rehabilitation costs
associated with an occupational injury or illness;
3) Toprovidesubstantialprotectionagainst
interruption of income;
4) To encourage employers to provide safe workplaces.
The goals just cited were reaffirmed in 1972 by the National
Commission on State Workers' Compensation Laws in its report
to the President. Since the goalof providing safe
workplaces is no more important than wage replacement or
medical cost reimbursement, changing workers' compensation
systems to lower injury/illness rates can be done only to17
the extent that the changes do not diminish the worker's
ability to be justly compensated for time lost and medical
costs.
The primary mechanism whereby employers are encouraged
to provide safe workplaces is the experience rating system.
A base premium per worker-hour for workers' compensation
insurance is determined for all firms within a two digit SIC
code.The base premium is then adjusted for each firm based
on the individual firm's lost workday case incidence rate
for the previous three years.The three-year moving average
is used to smooth out changes in the rate due to random
variation.Due to the large fluctuations in the lost
workday case incidence rate for smaller firms which can
result from a minor change in the absolute number of
recordable injuries or illnesses, experience rating is not
used for firms below a certain size.For medium to large
firms, the experience rating system provides a financial
incentive to lower the number of lost time accidents.This
incentiveincreasesasworkers'compensationpremiums
escalate.
A component of the workers' compensation systems which
hasbeenshowntohaveasignificanteffecton
injury/illness rates is the percentage of the employee's
wage which is paid during recovery from an occupational
injury or illness, commonly known as the replacement rate.
The replacement rate is fixed by state statute, and varies
from 60 to 100% within the United States.mEconometric18
studies, which model the decision making of workers under
varying workers' compensation parameters (replacement rate,
waiting period, etc), have shown a significant positive
relationship between the replacement rate and the frequency
and severity ofoccupational injuries."A number of
studies have been performed using regression analysis of
replacement rates and the corresponding injury frequency and
severity rates for different states, yielding mixed results.
All of the studies reported a positive relationship between
the benefit level and injury frequency rates. 53,505,MThe
studies where indices of claim severity were evaluated
showed a positive relationship between replacement rate and
claim severity in one study," anegative relationship
between the replacement rate and the number of lost workdays
percaseinthesecondstudy,"andnosignificant
relationship between the number of lost workdays and the
replacement rate in the same study."An analysis in which
injury frequency rates were compared for a group of workers
before and after a reduction in the replacement rate (from
100 to 70%) revealed a positive relationship between the
replacement rate and the number of injuries resulting in
greater than seven days of lost time.°It should be noted
that,although not affecting the integrity ofstudies
comparing replacement rates, any stated replacement rate may
underestimate the true replacement rate due to the lower
costs experienced by recovering workers (e.g. commuting,
child care, etc.) and the availability of other forms of19
financialassistance (e.g. foodstamps).° Any
underestimation of the replacement rate would have an impact
on economic studies which attempt to model worker behavior
under various workers' compensation systems.
Three basic mechanisms have been used to explain the
relationship between benefit level and injury/illness rates.
The first explanation is temporal, i.e. benefit rates are
increased in response to rising injury/illness incidence
rates to provide greater incentives for prevention.This
argument has not proven to be valid in light of empirical
evidence,such as switching the benefit level from an
exogenous variable to an endogenous variable in regression
analyses62, and the examination of injury rates before and
after changes in the replacement rate.63
The second proposed mechanism is behavioral in nature.
The theory advanced is that given a higher replacement rate,
workers are more likely to engage in unsafe behaviors,
either consciously or unconsciously."The difficulty
with this theory, assuming conscious intent,is that it
ignores the non-monetary injury costs to the worker, such as
pain and the inability to engage in pleasurable activities.
The explanation for the observed association which appears
to have the greatest validity is that boosting benefit
levels increases the likelihood that a worker will file a
claim for a "marginal" injury, either an injury which may
not prevent a worker from performing the duties associated
with his/her job, or an injury which was not work-related,20
i.e. a fraudulent claim.Higher benefit levels may provide
an added economic incentive for workers to take time off for
chronic problems which diminish performance but do not
prevent them from doing their job.
A factor in a worker's decision whether to file for a
marginal claim is the perceived probability that the claim
will be accepted.Under the no-fault system, the burden of
proof on the worker filing the claim is to prove injury or
illness, via a medical practitioner's diagnosis, and to
demonstrate that the injury or illness was a result of the
worker's employment. Critics of workers'compensation
systems attribute increases in injury/illness rates and
claim costs to increasing leniency in granting claims.In
the case ofinjury determination,certainsoft-tissue
injuries, notably strains and sprains, are diagnosed based
on the patient's report of pain or restriction of movement;
this method ofdiagnosisconceivably could resultin
exaggerated or fraudulent claims of injury. Associating the
injury or illness with employment is difficult for many
types of injuries (e.g. sprains and strains), and is based
largely on the injured worker's statements and verification
by the worker's supervisor.The scope of injuries and
illnesses which are compensable will also affect both total
claim costs and injury/illness rates reported under the
workers' compensation system.An example frequently cited
in the lay media is the increase in stress-related claims.
The decision concerning whether to file a marginal21
workers' compensation claim might be based on the expected
return (benefit level) and the probability of realizing the
return (leniency).Increases in either benefit level or
leniency would be expected to lead to an increase in the
number of injury and illnesses reported.The importance of
theleniency and benefit levelfactors should not be
overstated.First, although the reported number of injuries
and illnesses may increase, the underlying true injury and
illness rates may remain constant. Second,these two
factors have their greatest impact on minor or marginal
claims, and become irrelevant in cases of obvious injury or
in cases where the injury or illness was clearly due to the
individual's employment.
The effect of changes in benefit levels was discussed
previously.The concept of leniency does not lend itself to
quantitative analysis,and thus there are no empirical
studiesaddressingtheeffectofclaimdetermination
judgements on injury/illness rates.22
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Regression Analysis
Introduction
Studies performed by various researchers have shown
associations between occupational injury/illness rates and
an assortment of independent variables.The independent
variables studied can be divided into two categories:
internal and external.Internal factors, including age
distribution of the workers,gender,wages,amount of
overtime, percent of budget spent on safety, etc., are firm-
specific and, to a certain extent, within the control of
management.External factors, the focus of this study, are
those variables which are not within the control of the
safety manager. External forces that could influence
injury/illness rates include regulatory effort, fluctuation
in the economy, changes in the workers' compensation system,
and firm size. Delineating the relationships between
measures of these forces and indicators of occupational
injury/illnessfrequencyandseverityfacilitatesthe
understanding of the strength of the forces on occupational
injury/illness rates and provides a basisfor predicting
injury/illness rates based
factors.
on changesin theexternal
Thisstudyexaminedtherelationshipsbetween
occupational injury/illnessratesand selectedexternal
factors using injury/illness rate statistics and data from
various agencies in the state of Oregon for the period 197828
through 1987.29
Methods
Theinjury/illnessrateandfirmsizedata were
obtainedfrom annualsurveys performed by the Oregon
DepartmentofInsuranceandFinance(ODIF),Accident
PreventionDivision(nowcalledOregonOSHA). The
regulatory performance data was obtained from the ODIF
Information Management Division,Research and Analysis
Section.Oregon OSHA expenditure data were obtained from
the ODIF Budget Division. Workers'Compensation claim
determination data were obtained from the Oregon Workers'
CompensationDepartment. Employmentstatisticswere
obtained from the Oregon Department of Labor, Employment
Division.Figures for the gross state product were obtained
from the Oregon Economic Development Department.Analysis
of the data was performed using multiple linear regression
on three dependent variables, including the occupational
injury/illness incidence rate, lost workday cases incidence
rate, and lost workday rate.The independent variables
included in each of the regression models were determined
using a step-down selection process.Table 1 presents the
range and arithmetic means for the independent variables.
Injury /illness Rates
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 required
employers to record worker injuries and illnesses in a
prescribed format whenever the injury or illness was not
treatable with first aid alone.Each case is classified as
to whether or not time was lost from work, and the total30
Table 1
Range and Arithmetic Mean for Independent Variables
Variable Range Mean
Unemployment
(annual rate)
6.0 - 11.5 8.6
Gross State Product' 3.20 - 3.95 3.63
($10 billion)
Inspections 4.916 - 11.31 6.532
(1000)
Violations 1.752 - 3.629 2.662
(1000)
Penalties' 4.136 - 13.11 7.466
($100,000)
OSHA expenditures' 5.38 - 6.11 5.70
($ million)
Workers' Compensation 3.06 - 7.83 5.71
(% denied claims)
Notes:1.Adjusted for inflation using Consumer Price
Index for Western States, 1982-1984=100.31
days lost recorded for each case.
The Accident Prevention Division (APD), Research and
Analysis Section of ODIF conducts an annual survey of Oregon
businesses using a methodology prescribed by the U.S.
Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics(BLS).
Questionnaires are mailed to a sample of firms within a
three-digit SIC category; the sample size for each unit is
determined using historical dataon variationinthe
incidenceratesfortheunit. Totalquestionnaires
distributed ranged from 7,917 to 9,118; response rate varied
from 97 to 99%.An additional 10-13% of the responses were
excluded due to the firm going out of business, out of the
scopeofthesurvey,duplicatemailings,etc. The
questionnaire requests information on number of employees,
type of business activity, month of first State or Federal
OSHA inspection, and a tabulation of occupational injuries
and illnesses by type, i.e. fatalities, lost workday cases,
and nonfatal cases without lost workdays.Information is
alsocollectedregardingthenatureofoccupational
illnesses and the number oflost workdays or days of
restricted activity. To minimize any reporting effects that
might result from employers'fear of reprisal from the
regulators, the respondents (private sector employers) are
not identified.'
The injury/illness incidence rate for a given year is
calculated for three digit SIC code categories using data
collected by the survey.In addition, a composite rate is32
reported for the private sector as a whole.The formula for
the injury/illness incidence rate is given as:
IR =N X 200,000
EH
where: IR = Incidence rate
N = Number of injuries and/or illnesses
EH = Total hours worked by all employees
during the calendar year
200,000 = Base for 100 full-time equivalent
workers (working 40 hours per week,
50 weeks per year)
The rates for an individual firm are thus standardized,
using the factor of 200,000, for 100 employees working 40
hours a week for 50 weeks per year.Similar rates are
calculatedforlost workday casesincidenceandlost
workdays.The formula for the two rates is identical as
that used to calculate the injury/illness incidence rate,
except for the substitution of only lost workdaycases or
total lost workdays for the number of cases in the preceding
formula.Table 2 presents the injury/illness incidence,
lost workday case incidence, and lost workday rates for
Oregon from 1978 through 1987. The injury/illness incidence
rate provides a measure of the frequency of occupational
injuries and illnesses; the lost workday case incidence and
lostworkdayratesreflecttheseverityofthe
injury/illness events.The lost workday case incidence33
Table 2
Occupational Injury/illness Rates for Oregon
1978-1987
Injury/illnessLost Workday CasesLost Workday
Year Incidence Rate Incidence Rate Rate
1978 14.0 7.1 124.7
1979 12.8 7.2 122.2
1980 11.3 6.5 116.4
1981 10.4 5.7 106.1
1982 9.5 5.1 97.8
1983 9.8 5.2 98.3
1984 10.6 5.6 107.6
1985 10.5 5.5 115.9
1986 10.7 5.7 116.3
1987 10.9 5.6 123.8
Notes: 1. Rates are number of events per 200,000 man-hours.
2. Maximum relative standard errors for
injury/illness and lost workday cases incidence
rate is 2%; for lost workdays, 4%.
Source:Oregon Occupational Injury and Illness Survey,
Oregon Department of Insurance and Finance, 1978-
1987.34
rate is used by Oregon OSHA to schedule inspections.
Graphs of the three rates, shown in Figure 1,show
similar trendsfor theinjury/illnessincidence,lost
workday case incidence and lost workday rates.A steady
decline is evident for all three rates from 1978 through
1982; the rates then begin an upward trend that continues
through 1987, the end of the study period.
Oregon OSHA
The effect of the regulatory effort was assessed using
both budgetary data for the Accident Prevention Division
(APD),the agency responsible for enforcement of OSHA
regulations, and by using specific performance indicators,
including number of inspections,violations,and total
penalties.
The total APD budget was provided for two-year periods
by the Budget Section, Oregon OSHA, from unpublished data.
The figures provided were the legislatively approved budget
totals, except for the 1977-79 and 1983-85 bienniums, for
which the Governor's recommended budgetswere used due to
the unavailability of the actual budget figures.According
toagency personnel,theactualbudgetsforthetwo
bienniums probably did not differ significantly from the
Governor's Recommended Budget.2
Each biennial budget covered two fiscal year periods;
the fiscal year for Oregon begins July 1 and ends June 30.15
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The total budgets for each biennium were divided into four
half-year values; the half-year values were then tallied to
provide budget figures for calendar years.The assumption
that spending levels were constant within the biennium is
valid according to agency personnel.3The calendar year
values then were adjusted for inflation using the Consumer
Price Index (1982-84=100) for Western states (OR, WA, CA,
AK, HI).4 The adjusted APD budget levels are given in Table
3.
Oregon OSHA maintains internal records of the number of
inspections, number of citations, and the total dollar value
of penalties assessed for each month.The agency reports
these data summarized for each federal fiscal year.5To
analyze the data based on calendar years, the raw monthly
data were obtained from the Research and Analysis Section of
Oregon OSHA and compiled into a calendar year format.
The number of inspections performed for a given year
provides a measure of the presence of the regulators in the
field, and, by extension, the likelihood that any single
firm was inspected.The hypothesis is that as the number of
inspections performed increases, the injury/illness rate
should decrease due to a higher degree of compliance with
safety and health standards. The deterrent effect is
subject to variation (because of administrative decisions)
depending on the industries or groups of industries which
receive a larger relative proportion of the inspections.37
Table 3
Budgeted Expenditures for OR-OSHA, 1978-1987
Adjusted for Inflation
Year Budgeted Expenditures Adjusted Dollars'
1978 $3,973,100 $6,112,460
1979 4,346,180 5,986,470
1980 4,719,250 5,665,370
1981 5,292,230 5,758,680
1982 5,865,210 6,021,780
1983 5,775,730 5,834,070
1984 5,686,260 5,488,670
1985 5,834,820 5,402,610
1986 5,983,390 5,414,830
1987 6,146,210 5,377,260
Notes: 1.1982-84=100
Source:Oregon Department of Insurance and Finance, Budget
Section38
The numberof violationsinaspecificcategory
(serious, de minimus, etc.) cited for a given inspection
reflects both the intensity of the inspection and the
judgment of the inspector concerning the severity of the
violations discovered.The number of serious violations
cited for a given year was the data set used in this
analysis,sincenon-seriousviolationshavesmaller
penalties attached,and de minimus violations carry no
monetary penalty and thus would not have the same deterrent
effect.The hypothesis is one of a negative relationship,
that is, the injury/illness rates should decrease as the
number of serious violations increases.
The penalties associated with violations provide an
economic incentive for employers to maintain compliance with
health and safety standards.Thus, as the total dollar
value of penalties increases, the injury/illness rates are
expected to decrease in the same or subsequent years.The
actual penalty paid for a given violation is determined
after an appeal process, and is often decoupled from the
year in which the violation took place.For this reason,
the proposed penalties were used in this study.The dollar
values of the penalties for each year were adjusted to 1982
dollars using the Consumer Price Index for Western states.6
Economic Factors
Data were collected on two different measures of39
economic activity for the state: the unemployment rate and
the total economic output(gross state product). The
unemployment data were provided from unpublished sources by
the Oregon Employment Division; figures for the gross state
product were provided by the Oregon Department of Economic
Development.
Several authors have identified increases in injury
rates associated with increases in the accession rate, or
rate of new hires.7'8'9Data on the accession rate were not
available for the state of Oregon; the unemployment rate was
chosen asa surrogate for the accession rate. Since
reductions in unemployment represent recalled workers as
wellas new hires,use of the unemployment rate may
underestimatetheeffectoftheaccessionrateon
injury/illness rates.
The Oregon Employment Division collects employment data
from a monthly household survey.The average unemployment
rate is calculated for each calendar year from the monthly
data; the annual unemployment rate was used in the analysis.
In addition to the new-hire effect, researchers have
identified other business cycle forces that may have an
impact on injury/illness rates.Specifically, increases in
the number of hours worked and the rate of production, both
of which precede the hiring of new workers, have been
associated with higherinjury/ illnessrates .1°°11,12°13 To
estimate the effect of these work intensity forces, data
were collected on the gross state product (GSP) for Oregon40
for the period 1978-87.The gross state product values were
provided by the Oregon Economic Development Department from
unpublished data. The GSPis generated by theU.S.
Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis.All
of the values were corrected forinflation using the
Consumer Price Index for Western states.14The value for
the 1987 GSP was not yet available at the time this study
was performed.The value was predicted using a regression
on personal income and GSP for 1978-86 and personal income
data for 1987.
Workers' Compensation
The effects that Workers' Compensation (WC)systems
have on occupational injury/illness rates has received
considerable attention.Two of the factors that have been
identifiedashavingasignificantimpactonthe
injury/illness rates are the wage replacement rate, which
hasbeenstudiedextensively, 15,16,1738,19andleniencyin
claim determination, both in the type of claims and the
assignability of an injury or illness to the workplace.The
impact that the overall leniency of WC systems has on
occupational injury/illness rates has not been examined
empirically. The wage replacement rate remained constant in
Oregon during the study period, and thus was not included in
the analysis.To estimate the relative leniency in the
Oregon WC system from year to year, the percentage of denied
claims was calculated for each year from unpublished data
provided by the Oregon Department of Insurance and Finance,41
Research and Analysis Section.Although it is the best
available statistic, a rise in the percentage could be the
result of a higher number of "borderline" claims being
filed, rather than a measure of the leniency of the system.
The hypothesis under evaluation is that as the fraction of
denied claims increases, there should be a corresponding
decrease in the injury/illness rates.
Size of Firms
The size of a firm has been shown to be correlated with
injury rates in a study involving firms of different size
within the same industrial classification."The reported
association was curvilinear (inverted U).In addition,
several studies have included firm size as an independent
variableinmultiplelinearregressionmodelsof
occupational injury rates; the studies report a negative
regression coefficient for firm size. 21,22,23 The annual
Oregon Occupational Injury and Illness Survey includes data
on injury/illness incidence rates stratified by ten size
categories (seven prior to 1981).Due to the non-linear
relationshipreportedbyLeighandthepreliminary
examination of the size-specific injury/illness incidence
ratesforthisstudy,firmsize wasexcludedasan
independent variable from the linear regression analysis.
A plot of the mean injury/illness rate for 1978 through 1987
by size category is given in Figure 2.op4
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Results
Injury/illness Incidence Rate
Table 4 presents the results of the linear regression
analysis with the injury/illness incidence rate as the
dependent variable.None of the independent variables were
eliminated using the step-down variable selection process
using an F-to-remove ratio of 4.0.Examination of the
correlation matrix for the independent variables showed a
strong positive correlation between the gross state product
(GSP) and unemployment variables, possibly distorting the
regression model.A second variable selection and multiple
regression run was performed excluding the GSP variable.
The second run resulted in elimination of all of the
variables except unemployment, workers' compensation (WC)
and inspections.The workers' compensation variable then
was removed from the model.The resulting R2, adjusted for
the degrees of freedom, was 0.93.The R2 value for the
model including workers' compensation was 0.98; thus an
insignificant amount of predictive capability was lost by
eliminating the WC variable.The results of the second
regression model are given in column 1 of Table 4.
A third regression model was constructed allowing the
independent variables tolag one year,i.e.the1980
injury/illness incidence rate was matched with the 1979
valuesfor theindependent variables,toexamine the
possibilityofconstructingapredictiveregression
equation. The same step-down elimination variable selection44
Table 4
Multiple Regression Results for Injury/illness
Incidence Rate
Regression Coefficient
[90% Confidence Interval]
Independent Variables 1 2(a)
Unemployment -0.35 -0.48
(annual rate) [- 0.50, -0.19] [-0.58,-0.38]
Inspections 0.45 (b)
(1000) [0.30,0.61]
Violations (b) -0.87
(1000) [ -1.2, -0.55]
Constant 11.07 17.21
R2 0.93 0.93
P-value <0.0001 0.0002
(a) values of the independent variables were regressed
with values of the dependent variable for the
following year
(b) variable was not selected for model45
procedure used for the previous analysis eliminated none of
the independent variables.The OSHA expenditure, GSP, and
penalties variables showed a high degree of collinearity
with several of the independent variables. The second model
was constructed excluding expenditures, penalties and GSP,
yielding unemployment percentage and violations as the
significant predictor variables. The results for the
predictive model are presented in column 2 of Table 4.The
R2 value for the model is 0.93 (adjusted for degrees of
freedom); the F-ratio for the ANOVA analysis for the full
regression was statistically significant (p=.0002).
Lost Workday Cases Incidence Rate
The variable selection and multiple regression model
using the lost workday cases incidence rate as the dependent
variableresultedinGSP,inspections,violations,
penalties, OSHA expenditures, and workers' compensation as
the selected variables using the F-to-remove ratio of 4.0,
with an R2 value of 0.99 (adjusted for degrees of freedom).
The inspections, violations, penalties, andOSHA
expenditures variables were removed to provide a more
concise model.The R2 value for the final model was equal
to 0.93; the F-ratio from the ANOVA on the full regression
was statistically significant (p<0.0001).The results for
the final model are given in column 1 of Table 5.Allowing
the independent variables to lag one year resulted in
unemployment and OSHA expenditures being incorporated in the
model.The results for the predictive model are summarized46
Table 5
Multiple Regression Results for Lost Workday Cases
Incidence Rate
Independent Variables
Regression Coefficient
[90% Confidence Interval]
1 2(a)
GSP 2.0 (b)
($10 billion) [1.4,2.5]
Workers' Compensation -0.29 (b)
(claims ratio) [- 0.37, -0.20]
Unemployment (b) -0.31
(annual rate) [-0.41,-0.21]
OSHA Expenditures (b) 0.86
($ million) [0.19,1.5]
Constant 0.42 3.6
R2 0.93 0.85
P-value <0.0001 0.002
(a) values of the independent variables were regressed
with values of the dependent variable for the
following year
(b) variable was not selected for model47
in column 2 of Table 5.
Lost Workdays
The initial variable selection and multiple regression
model with the lost workday rate as the dependent variable
yieldedunemployment,inspections,penaltiesandOSHA
expenditures as the variables entering the model. The
correlation matrix showed a high degree of collinearity
between OSHA expenditures, unemployment, and inspections.
A second model was constructed excluding the inspections
variable, resulting in unemployment selected as the only
variable included in the model.The results of the second
variable selection/multiple regression model are listed in
column 1 of Table 6.The R2 value for the full regression
was 0.94, adjusted for the degrees of freedom.The F-ratio
fortheANOVAanalysisforthefullregressionwas
statistically significant (p<.0001).
The independent variables were allowed to lag one year
in the third model.Collinearity between GSP, penalties,
and inspections and the other independent variables forced
construction of another model excluding GSP, penalties, and
inspections as candidate variables.The resulting multiple
regression model included unemployment, violations, and the
workers' compensation ratio as the selected variables.The
R2 value for the full regression was 0.80, adjusted for the
degrees of freedom.The results are summarized in column 2
of Table 6.48
Table 6
Multiple Regression Results for Lost Workday Rate
Independent Variables
Regression Coefficient
[90% Confidence Interval]
1 2(a)
Unemployment -5.2 -6.0
(annual rate) [-6.0,-4.4] [-8.1,-3.9]
Workers' Compensation (b) 4.1
(claims ratio) [1.6,6.6]
Violations (b) -6.1
(1000) [ -12, -0.54]
Constant 158 158
R2 0.94 0.80
P-value <0.0001 0.01
(a) values of the independent variables were regressed
with values of the dependent variable for the
following year
(b) variable was not selected for model49
Discussion
Of the independent variables analyzed, unemployment
appears to be the most useful for predicting occupational
injury/illnessrates. Theunemploymentvariable was
includedinfive of the six regression models. The
relationship was negative in all cases, consistent with
previous studies at both the micro and macro levels, each of
which reported negative relationships.24a-"The negative
relationshipbetweenunemployment andoccupational
injury/illness rates has been attributed to the overall
experience level in a firm; less experienced employees are
more likely to become injured or ill at work than their more
experienced counterparts.The relationship was stronger in
themodelswhichincorporatedaone-year"lagtime"
("predictive model"), suggesting that employers might reduce
the impact of increases in employment by adjusting safety
training investments a year in advance in response to
current employment trends.
The gross state product (GSP) variable was included in
the lost workday cases incidence model, and demonstrated a
positive regression coefficient.The positive relationship
isconsistent with findingsfrom previously published
studies
.27,28,29,3°None of the models included both the GSP
and unemployment variables; this was expected since both are
measures of economic activity.
Theregressioncoefficientforthenumberof
inspections performed by OR-OSHA waspositivein the50
injury/illness incidence rate model, suggesting that the
rate of injuries and illnesses increases as OSHA inspections
become more frequent.It seems doubtful whether inspections
actually increase accident frequency; the higher rates are
more likely due to an increase in the number of injuries and
illnesses reported due to improvements in record keeping
brought about by the inspections.
Of the OR-OSHA parameters included in the study, the
number of serious violations reported was the most useful in
predictingoccupationalinjury/illnessrates. The
violations variable showed a strong negative association in
the predictive models for the injury/illness incidence rate
and lost workday rate.The negative relationship between
thenumberofseriousviolationscitedandthe
Injury/illnessrates mayindicate that thenumberof
violations cited has a deterrent effect, causing employers
to increase safety efforts in response to more aggressive
enforcement.From the analysis, it appears that violations
may be a stronger motivator for employers than the penalties
assessed.The apparent relationship between the number of
violations and the three rates is meaningful considering
that the proportion of injuries resulting from a violation
ofa standard has been reported to range from 10to
26%.31,32Thus, although only a fraction of the potential
hazards are corrected due to a violation being cited, the
added deterrenteffect may elicitahigherlevelof
compliance,andtherebylowerratesofinjuriesand51
illnesses in the workplace. Because the violations variable
exhibited significant negative relationships in two of the
three predictive models for occupational injury/illness
rates, while the inspection variable showed a positive
coefficient in the injury/illness incidence rate model, the
results from this study suggest that performing fewer
inspections to allow for greater depth for each inspection
performed may reduce the illness/injury rates more than
increasing inspection frequency.The lack of a significant
negative coefficient for penalties may indicate a need for
higher penalties to encourage compliance.
The Workers'Compensation variable(percentageof
deniedclaims)wastheonlyvariabletodemonstrate
regression coefficientsofbothsigns. The negative
coefficient in the lost workday cases incidence model was
consistent with the hypothesis that as the WC system becomes
more lenient (percentage of denied cases decreases), there
is a corresponding increase in the reported number of lost
time injuries and illnesses.The positive coefficient for
the lost workday rate model was not expected,andis
difficult to explain.It would be expected that, as a
greater number of borderline cases are denied, the lost
workday rate would decrease.As was mentioned earlier, the
results for the WC variable are only valid if the proportion
of borderline claims remained constant over the study
period, an assumption that was not verified in this study.
Overall,the resultsofthisstudy suggestthat52
occupational injury and illness rates are influenced by
external factors. The best predictor variable for all three
dependentvariables,forboththecurrentyearand
subsequent years, is the unemployment rate.53
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The results of the regression analysis on data from the
State of Oregon,and results from previously conducted
studies,support the development of models capable of
predicting occupationalinjury andillness ratesfrom
various external factors.The strong relationship between
the unemployment rate and the measures of injury/illness
frequency and severity suggest that any evaluation of
changes in injury/illness rates, whether at the micro (firm)
or macro (state or federal) level, must control for changes
in employment.Indices of economic growth (e.g. gross state
product,etc.)havebeenpositivelycorrelatedwith
injury/illness rates in other analyses; the results from the
regression on Oregon data confirm the relationship for the
lost workday cases incidence rate.
Neither the number of inspections conducted by OSHA nor
the penaltiesassessed appear tosignificantlyimpact
occupational injury/illness rates.The number of serious
violations cited showed a deterrent effect in the regression
analysis of Oregon data; none of the previously published
studies reported a relationship between violations cited and
changes in injury/illness rates. The inability to establish
a negative relationship between injury/illness rates and
eitherinspectionsor penaltiessuggests that current
inspection frequencies and penalties may be inadequate to
encourage compliance or other safety related activities57
(training, self-inspection, etc.).A positive relationship
was observed between OSHA expenditures and the lost workday
cases incidence rate in predictive regression model for
Oregon data, consistent with one other study that reported
a similar relationship between Federal OSHA expenditures and
the lost workday rate.'It has not been established that
the relationship is causal.The apparent correlation may be
due to a confounding variable, economic growth, which has
demonstratedapositivecorrelationwithoccupational
injury/illness ratesinthisand previously published
studies.OSHA expenditures would be expected to increase
during periodsofeconomic expansionastax revenues
increase; however, the increased spending on the regulatory
effort may not be able to offset the effect of economic
expansion and the corresponding increase in occupational
injury/illness rates.
Thereplacementrateusedforcalculatingthe
compensation for lost income in workers' compensation cases
has demonstrated a positive correlation with injury/illness
incidence rates;mixed results have been reported for
severity measures.No conclusions can be drawn concerning
the effect ofleniencyin workers'compensation claim
determinationoninjury/illnessfrequencyorseverity
measures due to the lack of published evidence and the
conflicting results for the lost workday case incidence and
lost workday rates in the regression analyses performed for
this study.58
Firm size demonstrated a curvilinear relationship with
injury/illness incidence rates in this and one previous
study.Use of firm size in linear models is valid only if
firms of greater than 50-100 employees are included in the
study.
The results of this study support the hypothesis that
external factors have a significant impact on occupational
injury/illness rates, thereby allowing for the construction
of statistical models with a high predictive capability.
The predictor variables are different for measures of
injury/illness frequency and severity; therefore, separate
sets of variables should be used to predict injury/illness
incidence, lost workday case incidence, and lost workday
rates.
The results of this study suggest that further research
should be conducted in the following areas:
- The effects of reforms in Workers' Compensation systems
on occupational injury/illness rates.
- The relationships at the micro (firm)level between
OSHA inspection frequency and size of penalties and
occupationalinjury/illnessratestoassessthe
adequacyofinspectionfrequencyandpenalties
assessed.
- The relationship between OSHA consultative efforts and
occupational injury/illness rates.
- Themechanismswhichcausethedifferencesin
injury/illness incidence rates among firms of different59
size (number of employees).
- The effects of changes in the demographics of the
workforce on occupational injury/illness rates.
- The impact of changes in the unemployment rate within
specificindustryclassificationsonoccupational
injury/illness rates.60
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